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COMMENTARY

Issues in the Design of Formulary
Apportionment in the Context of
NAFTA
RICHARD D. POMP*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Professor McDaniel's article 1 reflects the breadth of intellectual inquiry characteristic of his scholarship. He provides an invaluable service by stimulating serious discussion of "formulary apportionment/
combined reporting" 2 in the context of the North American Free
Trade Agreement. 3 This issue is a worthy one and his work will be the
starting point for any serious discussion in the future.
My commentary is directed to his proposal as it relates to formulary
apportionment. I gladly embrace the opportunity because that part of
his article is especially relevant, even independent of NAFTA. The
* Alva P. Loiselle Professor of Law, University of Connecticut Law School. I am indebted to my good friend Mike McIntyre for sharing with me the kinds of insights that only
someone conversant with both the federal and state tax systems could have.
I Paul R. McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North American Free Trade Zone, 49
Tax L. Rev. 691 (1995).
2 1 use the term formulary apportionment/combined reporting as a reminder that both
features are essential components of any serious tax regime along the lines proposed by
Professor McDaniel. By combined reporting, I mean that the preapportionment tax base
will not be limited to only that of a corporation having factors in the NAFTA region, but
also will include the income of related corporations, regardless of whether they also have
NAFTA factors. To illustrate, assume a U.S. corporation owns a non-NAFTA corporation
(that is, a corporation incorporated in a country other than Canada, the United States or
Mexico). Suppose the U.S. corporation has NAFTA factors so that it apportions income to
some (or all) of the NAFTA countries. If the U.S. corporation were to file a combined
report, the income and factors of the non-NAFTA corporation would be combined with
those of the U.S. corporation. Intercorporate transactions between the two also would be
eliminated, similar to the treatment of intercorporate transactions in a federal consolidated
return. Essentially, in a combined report, a non-NAFTA corporation would be treated as
if it were a branch of the U.S. parent. Without a combined report, form rather than substance would control a corporation's tax liability because a corporation would be treated
differently depending on whether it chose to incorporate a branch.
3 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 8-17, 1992,32 I.L.M. 289,32 LLM. 605
[hereinafter NAFTA].
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tax community is well aware of the defects in the federal arm's length/
source rule regime.4 Some commentators have suggested that a modified version of the type of formulary apportionment/combined reporting regimes used by the states5 could serve as a replacement for what
they view as the fatally flawed federal approach. 6 Indeed, when Professor McIntyre testified before Congress and suggested the use of
formulary apportionment/combined reporting in the NAFTA region, 7
he seized on a politically opportune moment to advance the case for
replacing the federal system. Most new ideas have a minimum gestation period, and I am delighted that Professor McIntyre's proposal
and Professor McDaniel's article start the period running.
Professor McIntyre notes how the states, which have had long experience with formulary apportionment, are natural allies of Professor
8
McDaniel's proposal and could be looked to for political support.
The other group of allies, although probably not as powerful politically, are the third world countries. For years, academics have discussed formulary apportionment/combined reporting with third world
leaders as a possible replacement for the arm's lengthsource rule approach that nearly all developing countries find nigh impossible to adTAX LAW REVIEW

4 In using the term "arm's length/source rule," I am following the practice of Professor
Michael J. McIntyre. He was the first commentator to consistently use this term to describe the federal rules. E.g., Michael J. McIntyre, Contrasting Methodologies: A Systematic Presentation of the Differences Between An Arm's-Length/Source-Rule System and a
Combined-Reporting/Formulary-Apportionment System, 87th Conf. on Tax'n, Nat'l Tax
Ass'n 226 (Frederick Stocker ed., 1995). He purposely chose this terminology to emphasize the key role source rules play in the federal system. Defenders of the arm's length
source rule system claim that it is less arbitrary than formulary apportionment/combined
reporting. Nearly all of the criticism of the federal rules in the international context has
focused on the transfer pricing aspect of separate accounting, but tho arm's length approach obviously incorporates source rules, which are inherently arbitrary.
5 While all states use some form of formulary apportionment, not all provide for combined reporting.
6 Jerome R. Hellerstein, Federal Income Taxation of Multinationals: Replacement of
Separate Accounting with Formulary Apportionment, 60 Tax Notes 111 (Aug. 23, 1993).
Viewing formulary apportionment/combined reporting as a substitute for separate accounting/source rules is not a new idea. The League of Nations Treaty of 1933, for example, provided for the use of formulary apportionment if separate accounting did not work
satisfactorily. Commercial Agreement, Apr. 24, 1933, 139 L.T.S. 129.
7 The Breakdown of IRS Tax Enforcement Regarding Multinational Corporations:
Revenue Losses, Excessive Litigation, and Unfair Burdens for U.S. Producers Before the
Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1993) (statement of
Professor Michael J. McIntyre); see also Robert S. McIntyre & Michael 3. McIntyre, Using
NAFTA to Introduce Formulary Apportionment, 6 Tax Notes Int'l 851' (Apr. 5, 1993).
8 Michael J. McIntyre, Commentary, The Design of Tax Rules for the North American
Free Trade Alliance, 49 Tax L. Rev. 769,793 (1994) [hereinafter Commentary]. California
has been an especially strong defender of the virtues of formulary apportionment/combined reporting.
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minister. 9 I am hopeful that if solutions to some of the technical
problems discussed in Professor McDaniel's article can be found, the
third world might join the states in rallying behind his proposal. At
the least, if some of the details could be fleshed out, other countries
might adopt formulary apportionment/combined reporting for use in
their own regional trade alliances.
As a counterweight to this support, most multinational enterprises
are likely to oppose Professor McDaniel's proposal, in part out of the
fear that formulary apportionment/combined reporting might spread
to other countries, but especially to the third world. I often have suspected that much of the opposition by Japanese corporations to California's use of formulary apportionment and worldwide combined
reporting ("WWCR") was not so much because they cared about the
California tax per se. After all, while they were vigorously lobbying
against WWCR, the yen appreciated relative to the dollar, and
WWCR actually helped them reduce their California tax by apportioning more income outside that state. Quite possibly, their real concern was that the California system would be replicated throughout
the Pacific Rim.
Whether or not I am right about the Japanese motives in California,
it is safe to predict that the multinationals will attempt to stifle any
incipient movement toward formulary apportionment/combined reporting.10 Ironically, California recently won a major Supreme Court
case upholding against constitutional challenge the application of
WWCR to the Barclays multinational banking enterprise.' Yet, by
9 One variation of this theme involves the use of formulary apportionment/combined
reporting by a third world country as an alternative minimum tax to the tax calculated
under a separate accounting/source rule approach.
10 The U.S. federal system already contains aspects of formulary apportionment. See
McDaniel, note 1, at 703-04. As Professor McDaniel notes, because of these features, taxpayers should be familiar with formulary apportionment and may not view "shifting to
formulary apportionment within the NAFrA zone ...

as revolutionary as might be

thought." Id. at [619]. Professor McDaniel also notes that formulary apportionment is
used by the Service in certain advance pricing agreements ("APA"s). Id.; see note 11. The
political problem, as I see it, is not that taxpayers are unfamiliar with formulary apportionment, but that they are all too familiar with it. After all, most corporations doing business
in the United States that file federal tax returns probably already file state tax returns, and
thus have first hand experience with formulary apportionment/combined reporting. Because California is such a key economic market, most large multinational corporations
were conversant with that state's long debate over WWCR and many were active participants. 'The very advantages that commentators see as flowing from formulary apportionment-eliminating the need to police transfer pricing and emasculating the benefits of tax
havens-are likely to be seen as disadvantages by taxpayers. See notes 15, 16 and 49.
11 Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2263 (1994). Although Barclays challenged the California tax, it apparently does not oppose formulary apportionment under
all circumstances. While challenging California's use of \VWCR, Barclays negotiated an
APA with the Service that used principles of formulary apportionment. Gerald C. Shea,
APAs May Effectively Address Income and Expense Allocation Problems Faced by Global
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the time the Supreme Court had given its imprimatur to WWCR, the
California legislature had succumbed to political pressures and re12
treated to a water's edge system.
Because of the expected opposition to any attempt to advance the
use of formulary apportionment/combined reporting in the context of
NAFTA, it is critical that great care be given to the details of Professor McDaniel's proposal. The ambitious breadth of his article required by necessity that he paint with a broad brush. Nevertheless, he
has identified the types of problems that will arise from a shift to a
formulary system. He has suggested some tentative approaches, rejected others and properly remained agnostic on still others. All the
issues he raises are complex, and each one could be the subject of
future research. But, of course, the devil is in the details; it is to these
details that I now turn.
Section II identifies two constraints that I feel unnecessarily hamper
Professor McDaniel's approach. Section III discusses technical issues
that arise in any system of formulary apportionment/combined reporting, whereas Section IV focuses on those problems that especially
need to be thought through afresh in the context of NAFTA.
My commentary draws heavily on the experience of the states,
which is only natural because they are the taxing jurisdictions with the
most formulary apportionment/combined reporting experience. Relating this experience to NAFTA helps to identify virtues and drawbacks in various responses to the problems Professor McDaniel
perceptively identifies.
TAX LAW REVIEW

II.

UNNECESSARY CONSTRAINTS

Preliminarily, I think Professor McDaniel has bridled himself with
two unnecessary constraints: (1) the adoption of a water's edge limitation and (2) the incorporation of a unitary business requirement.
Freed of these two constraints, it will be easier to resolve some of the
technical issues that inevitably are confronted when two fundamentally different systems-formulary apportionment/combined reporting
and arm's length/source rules-interface.
Trading Businesses, 4 Tax Notes Int'l 1022 (May 18, 1992); John Turro, IRS Grants TWo
APAs in Derivative Products Areas, 4 Tax Notes Int'l 959 (May 11, 1992); see also Robert
E. Ackerman, Sandy Cohen, Jennifer Deville, D. Clark Norton, Kathryn H. O'Brien, Cindra Rehman, Monique Van Herksen & Steven C. Wrapp, The Advanced Pricing Agree-

ment (APA) Program: A Model Alternative Dispute Resolution Process, Daily Tax Rep.
(BNA), Jan. 19, 1994, at L-4 (Case Ex. 2). Case Example 2 is widely believed to be the
APA entered into with Barclays.
12 In the California context, water's edge refers to the exclusion of most foreign corpora.
tions from a combined report. Professor McDaniel uses the term in a different sense,

which leads to unnecessary complications. See discussion in Section 11A.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Tax Law Review

1994]

COMMENTARY

A.

The Water's Edge Constraint

The first constraint is Professor McDaniel's willingness to limit his
proposal to what he describes as the "water's edge." By this, he
means that formulary apportionment would apply only to income
sourced within the NAFIA countries and that the apportionment
formula would include only NAFrA factors. 13 One consequence of
this definition is that Professor McDaniel first would use federal
source rules and arm's length principles to determine the income of a
corporation from Canadian, U.S. or Mexican sources.1 4 Only that income would enter into the preapportionment tax base. This approach
undercuts one of the major benefits of formulary apportionmenteliminating the need to police transfer prices. 5
Consider, for example, Professor McDaniel's treatment of a corporation having both a NAFTA branch and a non-NAFTA branch. He
would apply the arm's length methodology and source rules to calculate the taxable income of the NAFIA branch. 16 Once the amount of
income sourced in the NAFTA region is determined, the principles of
formulary apportionment would assign that income to Canada, the
17
United States and Mexico.
If I understand Professor McDaniel's approach correctly, he has

complicated matters unnecessarily. There is no need in the above situation to combine formulary apportionment with arm's length/source

rules. Consistent with the principles of formulary apportionment, the
amount of taxable income attributable to each of the NAFTA coun13 McDaniel, note 1, at 727.

14 Another consequence is that non-NAFTA corporations would not be included in a

combined report. See note 38.
15 As long as formulary apportionment/combined reporting is limited to the NAFTA
countries, the transfer pricing problem remains for corporations not subject to the proposed regime.
16 McDaniel, note 1, at 728. In the case of a non-NAFTA corporation with a NAFTA
branch, Professor McDaniel would determine the branch's income using "the arm's length
principle or the formulary rules applicable to branches. Of course, once the income attributable to a NAFTA country were determined, [formulary apportionment] would govern
the allocation of that income among the NAFTA countries." Id.; see also note 54. Presumably, Professor McDaniel also would use "the formulary rules applicable to branches" to
determine the income of a NAFrA branch of a NAFTA corporation. The reference to
formulary rules applicable to branches is probably a reference to § 1.863-3T(b)(2) of the
Regulations and to the formulas used for allocating deductions. See Reg. §§ 1.861-8(a);
1.861-8(e)(3),(4)-(8); 1.882-5; McDaniel, note 1, at 703-04.
17 It may not be obvious, but under Professor McDaniel's approach, the formula for
assigning NAFTA branch income to the NAFrA countries has to be different from the
formula he would use for apportioning income both within and without the NAFrA region. The formula used to assign the income of a NAFrA branch to the NAFTA countries
could not incorporate any non-NAFTA factors. Otherwise, the very income that Professor
McDaniel has determined to be attributable to the NAFTA region would be reapportioned
outside the region.
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tries should be calculated by applying the relevant formula' to a corporation's worldwide tax base. 19 Hence, there is no need to determine
the income of a branch of a corporation as a precondition to applying
20
formulary apportionment.

18See Section III.B.
19 Those familiar with state taxation will recognize that the approach in the text mirrors
California's calculation of its share of a multinational enterprise's worldwide income under
the state's previous WWCR regime. See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct.
2268 (1994); Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
20 Professor McDaniel defends his water's edge approach on two grounds. His first justification is that it may be required by existing tax treaties. McDaniel, note 1, at 727. He
does not elaborate on this argument.
In evaluating this argument, distinguishing two situations may be useful. First, consider
a NAFTA corporation with both NAFrA and non-NAFTA branches. / resumably, in this
case, no treaty issue is implicated because only the taxation of a NAFTA corporation by a
NAFTA country is involved. The formulary apportionment rules would be provided in a
trilateral tax treaty that would supersede the existing bilateral tax treaties among the
NAFrA countries.
Second, consider a non-NAFTA corporation with both NAFTA and non-NAFTA
branches. The issue is whether the use of formulary apportionment to determine the income of a NAFIA branch of a non-NAFrA corporation would violate an existing treaty
between the NAFTCA countries and the corporation's country of residence. I cannot comment on the interpretation of the Canadian or Mexican treaties on this point, but certainly
there is little firm guidance in the U.S. literature regarding the proper taxation of branches
of foreign corporations under U.S. treaties. In discussing the taxation of the U.S.-based
operations of a non-NAFTA corporation, Professor McDaniel states that the income of
such operations would continue to be determined under either the arm's length method or
the formulary rules applicable to branches. Id. at 728. The model treaty of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) also provides for the use of
apportionment principles under specified conditions in determining the income of a permanent establishment, although many U.S. treaties do not contain a similar provision.
OECD Model Income Tax Convention, July 23, 1992, art. 7, Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 191
[hereinafter OECD Model Ieaty].
No reported case exists challenging as a treaty violation the use of apportionment techniques, whether based on § 1.863-3T(b)(2) of the Regulations or otherwise, to determine
the income of the U.S. branch of a foreign corporation. To the extent that current practice
is to use formulary-rules, as Professor McDaniel suggests, the substitution of a different
formula, that is, the NAFTA apportionment formula, should not give rise to a legitimate
challenge under a treaty. If, on the other hand, the use of a formula under existing treaties
is uncommon, some opposition among our treaty partners can be expected, but such opposition would occur in any event. The only difference is that such resistance might now be
based on the more respectable grounds of objecting to an asserted treaty violation.
Professor McDaniel's second justification for a water's edge approach is founded on the
"reactions by some European companies and their governments to worldwide unitary
measures of some states in the United States, ... notably California ... ." McDaniel, note
1, at 727. This same reaction was unsuccessfully cited by the taxpayer in Barclays Bank v.
Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268,2283-84 (1994), in an attempt to establish that California's tax violated the foreign commerce clause. Because many of the hoped-for gains from
formulary apportionment/combined reporting would be undercut by Professor McDaniel's
water's edge approach, I would be unwilling to concede the issue without very compelling
reasons. I would hope that any future versions of his proposal would abandon this water's
edge constraint unless it appeared to be an absolutely essential concession.
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In other words, the federal concept of source is irrelevant in a formulary apportionment/combined reporting system. For this reason,
that part of Professor McDaniel's article that asserts that foreign
source dividends must be removed from the preapportionment tax
base under a water's edge approach21 is also an unnecessary constraint. If such dividends constitute part of the enterprise's unitary
business,2 they should be included in the preapportionment tax base,
regardless of source. The concept of source simply has no role to play
in a formulary system3P
B.

The Unitary Business Constraint

Another constraint that unnecessarily shapes Professor McDaniel's
proposal is that of a unitary business. He never articulates why a unitary business rule is either necessary or appropriate or how he would
define a unitary business.24 Presumably, he is piggybacking onto state
income tax doctrine. In the state context, the Supreme Court has
stated that the "linchpin of apportionability in the field of state income taxation is the unitary business principle," 2 and Professor McDaniel implicitly has made the same assumption about
apportionability in the context of a trilateral NAFTA tax treaty.
McDaniel, note 1, at 727; see Section HI.B.
Whether a unitary business principle is required as part of a NAFTA tax treaty is
discussed inSection .LB.
23 I would prefer that discussions about formulary apportionment avoid use of the word
"source" entirely because of the federal baggage that accompanies it. If source is to be
used at all, I would limit it to describing the amount of income assigned to a taxing jurisdiction after the application of formulary apportionment.
24 A common definition of unitary business is "[i]f the operation of the portion of the
business done within the state is dependent upon or contributes to the operation of the
business without the state, the operations are unitary .... " Edison Cal. Stores, Inc. v.
McColgan, 183 P.2d 16, 21 (Cal. 1947). A more particular statement of the test is that a
business is unitary if these circumstances are present: "(1) unity of ownership; (2) unity of
operation as evidenced by central purchasing, advertising, accounting and management
divisions; and (3) unity of use of its centralized executive force and general system of operation." Butler Bros. v. McColgan, 111 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1941). This approach by the
California courts is broader than that of other states. See, e.g., Texas Co. v. Cooper, 107
So.2d 676 (La. 1958). For a general treatment, see 1 Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State Taxation 8-76 to 8-197 (2d ed. 1993). The Supreme Court stated that the
"prerequisite to a constitutionally acceptable finding of unitary business is a flow of value,
not a flow of goods ....[A] relevant question in the unitary business inquiry is whether
'contributions to income [ ]resulted from functional integration, centralization of management, and economies of scale."' Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159, 178-79 (1983) (citations omitted). "[Tlhe out-of-state activities of the purported
'unitary business' [must] be related in some concrete way to the in-state activities...." Id.
at 166. "A final point that needs to be made about the unitary business concept is that it is
not, so to speak, unitary. there are variations on a theme .... " Id. at 167,
25 Mobil Oil Corp. v. Vermont, 445 U.S. 425, 439 (1980).
21

22
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To illustrate the context of the Court's statement, consider a corporation that conducts activities both within and without the taxing state.
Clearly, a state can tax income generated by activities occurring within
its boundaries; the issue is how to make that determination. Initially,
the states used separate accounting, but the defects in that approach
hastened the development of formulary apportionment. For a taxing
state to include all of a corporation's income in the preapportionment
tax base, some relationship must exist between those activities conducted within the taxing state and those activities conducted without
the state. Otherwise, the taxing state would have no right to include
in the tax base any income generated by the out-of-state activities.
That relationship, which is required by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, is satisfied if the activities within and the activities without the state are integrated, interdependent or synergistic.
'26
This relationship is encapsulated by the phrase "unitary business.
For example, consider a corporation that manufactures widgets in
State A, warehouses them in State B and sells them through an office
in State C to customers in State D. Because of the integrated, interdependent or synergistic relationship among the activities in the various
states, the corporation would be viewed as conducting 4 unitary business. Accordingly, each state, in determining its share of the corporation's income, would include the corporation's entire income in its
preapportionment tax base. Then each state would apply its apportionment formula to determine its share of the preapportionment tax
base.
In contrast, suppose part of the income of a corporation has nothing
to do with the activities conducted in the taxing state. For example,
assume a corporation conducts a dry cleaning operation in States A
and B and a parking lot operation in States C and D. The corporation
could be considered as conducting two different and independent unitary businesses.27 States A and B would apply formulary apportionment to assign the income of the dry cleaning operation between
themselves, and States C and D would apply formulary apportionment
to assign the income of the parking lot operation between themselves. 28 States A and B would not include the income from the parking lot operation in the corporation's preapportionment tax base, and
26 The unitary business principle grew out of the "unit rule" of the late 19th century,
which was used for apportioning the property tax of railroads, telegraph and express companies. Under the unit rule, the value of the entire enterprise was first determined and
then apportioned to a taxing jurisdiction through the use of a formula. Allied-Signal v.
New Jersey, 504 U.S. 768, 778-79 (1992).

27 For the opposite view, see text accompanying notes 36 and 37.

28 Presumably, some method akin to separate accounting would be used to determine

the income of the dry cleaning business and the income of the parking lot operation.
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the activities attributable to that operation would not enter into the
factors of the formula. Similarly, States C and D would not include
the income from the dry cleaning operation in the corporation's
preapportionment tax base, and the activities attributable to that operation would not enter into the factors of the formula.
In the state context, the concept of a unitary business is needed to
satisfy the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. (In
the federal context, the counterpart is the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.) The reason that States A and B constitutionally
cannot tax the parking lot operation is that insufficient contacts exist
between the activities of that operation and either of the two states to
satisfy the Due Process Clause. To say that no part of a unitary business is conducted in either State A or State B is another way of stating
that there are insufficient due process contacts between the corporation's activities and either State A or State B. This constitutional lack
of taxing jurisdiction is captured by stating that the parking lot is not
part of the unitary business (dry cleaning) conducted in State A or B.
Put differently, the corporation would be described as conducting two
independent and separate unitary businesses.
Many of the complexities that the states encounter in applying formulary apportionment arise from the unitary business concept. This
complexity might escalate if, to impose their taxes, the three NAFrA
countries had to agree on what parts of an enterprise's activities constitute a unitary business. 29 If the concept is unnecessary in the context of a NAFTA tax treaty, this definitional problem is avoided, along
with a panoply of other technical design problems.
The issue reduces to whether or not through a trilateral treaty, the
NAFTA countries could apply formulary apportionment to all the income of a NAFTA corporation regardless of whether a unitary business exists. For example, if a non-U.S. NAFTA corporation
conducted a parking lot operation within the United States and a dry
cleaning business elsewhere, could all of its income enter into its
which would be then apportioned
preapportionment tax base, part of 30
to and taxed by the United States?
29 See McDaniel, note 1, at 712.
30 Under federal law, the United States taxes U.S. corporations on their worldwide in-

come without any reliance on the unitary business concept. This assertion of taxing jurisdiction has gone unchallenged. Presumably, the act of incorporating in the United States

satisfies the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The United States taxes foreign
corporations on their income sourced in the United States. IRC §§ 881,882. Characterizing the income as sourced within the country supplies the necessary due process contacts.
Because the United States can tax a U.S. corporation on all of its worldwide income, no

constitutional problem should arise if that same amount of income enters into the preapportionment tax base in a formulary apportionment system. Accordingly, the due process
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This issue has two dimensions. First, would the Court, while paying
lip service to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, accept
a definition of a unitary business that would encompass all of the corporation's profit seeking activities? If that approach is outside any
acceptable definition of a unitary business, 31 could the Senate, in ratifying a NAFTA tax treaty, actually substitute its interpretation of the
Due Process Clause for that of the Court?
In the context of the Fourteenth Amendment, there are serious
doubts as to whether Congress, as a general proposition, can legislate
due process matters.3 2 But if economic issues are involved, Congress
might have more power. 33 In any event, a NAFTA tax treaty would
implicate the Fifth Amendment, not the Fourteenth. Although both
amendments use the same due process language, the Courts have not
held that they must be interpreted identically. 34 In addition, the conissue raised in the text is limited to the U.S. taxation of a Canadian or Mexican corporation
on an apportioned share of all of its worldwide income.
31 In ContainerCorp., the Court adopted a new standard for reviewifg the definition of
a unitary business: "whether the state court applied the correct standards to the case; and
if it did, whether its judgment was within the realm of permissible judgment." Container
Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 176 (1983).
32 See ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307,350 fi.14 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) ("Congress generally cannot waive a ruling of this Court decided under the
Due Process Clause"), reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 961 (1982). The ASARCO majority responded to Justice O'Connor's dissent by noting that the power of Congress to legislate "is
not presented in the case, and we imply no view as to it." Id. at 328 n.23. Chief Justice
Burger concurred in the majority opinion "in reliance on the Court's express statement
that the Court's holdings do not preclude future congressional action in this area." Id. at
331. More recently, the Court stated that Congress does not "have the power to authorize
violations of the Due Process Clause." Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305
(1992). This statement is dictum, however, because the issue of congressional power was
not before the Court in Quill.
For a broader view of Congress's power to legislate under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, see William Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 387 (1983).
33 Prior to Quill, two leading commentators concluded that if the Due Process Clause
prohibits the states from requiring out-of-state mail order houses to collect their use taxes
on goods delivered to the purchaser within the state, the Court likely would sustain congressional legislation providing for a contrary result. 2 Hellerstein & Hellerstein, note 24,
at 19-30 to 19-32. Since their analysis, the Court has held that no due process protection
necessarily exists in the situation to which they referred. Quill, 504 U.S. at 301-02.
34 No case has presented the issue discussed in the text, which involves the special responsibility of the United States with respect to foreign affairs. Analogies exist, however,
with respect to other situations, which support the general proposition that the Court will
apply different standards in evaluating constitutional challenges to federal legislation than
it will in evaluating analogous challenges to state legislation in light of certain sui generis
federal responsibilities. For example, in evaluating the federal government's power to regulate the admission of aliens, the Court has applied a less stringent due process standard
under the Fifth Amendment than what would have been applied under the Fourteenth
Amendment. U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950). Similarly, in applying an equal protection analysis to the federal government's regulation of foreign affairs
and alienage, the Court also has applied a less strict standard than what would have been
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stitutional question would arise in the context of the Senate's exercising its plenary power of treaty making.
There is no relevant learning on the standard that should apply in
evaluating the constitutionality of a NAFTA tax treaty that included
the entire income of a Canadian or Mexican corporation in the preapportionment tax base.35 The constitutional issue would be avoided,
however, if the Court were to endorse a broad view of a unitary business. The case for such a view would start by noting that the problem
of defining a unitary business involves determining the proper level of
generality with which to describe the activities of the taxpayer. This
problem is common in legal analysis,36 although the parallel with defining a unitary business has gone unrecognized.
A corporation's unitary business can be defined in various ways
from the most specific to the most general. To illustrate, consider a
corporation that manufactures widgets for use in the aerospace industry. On the least general level, the corporation could be described as
conducting a unitary business of manufacturing widgets for the aerospace industry. On a slightly more general level, the unitary business
could be described as manufacturing widgets. More generally, the
unitary business could be described as a manufacturer. On the most
general level, the corporation could be described as in the business of
allocating its resources to maximize its internal rate of return.
Under the last definition, all of a corporation's activities and all of
its income would constitute a unitary business. Suppose, therefore,
that in passing a NAFTA tax treaty, the Senate made clear findings of
fact that it considered all corporations to be conducting their activities
in order to maximize their internal rate of return, hardly an unrealistic
view. That legislative finding, made in the context of a NAFTA tax
treaty under the Senate's plenary power to negotiate treaties, might
make it difficult for the Supreme Court to substitute its own notions of
37
a unitary business.
applied under the Fourteenth Amendment. Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 8S
(1976). I am grateful to my good friend and colleague, Professor Richard S. Kay, for this
particular insight.
35 No constitutional problem arises in the case of a U.S. corporation. See note 30. I will
leave it to Canadian and Mexican commentators to raise any potential constitutional
problems under their systems.
36For example, the level of generality issue permeates equal protection analysis in
which the question is how broadly to define the relevant classes. See Kirk D. McQuiddy,
Note, Taxing Out-of-State Corporations After Western & Soudern: An Equal Protection
Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 877,891-93 (1982). See also Bruce Ackerman, Levels of Generality in Constitutional Interpretation: Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. Chi. L Rev. 317
(1992); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C Dorf, Levels of Generality in the Definition of
Rights, 57 Chi. L. Rev. 1057 (1990).
37 See note 31 for the standard of review in state cases. In interpreting the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court has rejected expansive definitions of a unitary business, including
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ISSUES INHERENT IN ANY FORMULARY SYSTEM

Combined Reports and the Treatment of Related Corporations

An issue linked to the definition of a unitary business involves the
treatment of related corporations. Unless form is to be elevated over
substance, no tax difference should result between a corporation that
operates through a branch and one that incorporates that branch and
operates it as a subsidiary. To disregard differences in the way a corporate family is organized, a mandatory consolidated report should be
imposed on related corporations. This approach is known in the state
38
context as a combined report.
ones consistent with that offered in the text. See, e.g., Allied Signal v. New Jersey, 504 U.S.
768 (1992); ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n, 458 U.S. 307, reh'g denied, 459
U.S. 961 (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Tax'n & Rev. Dep't of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 354,
reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 961 (1982). The states, however, have never couched their arguments in the context of the familiar legal problem of the level of generality discussed in the
text. Moreover, none of the states in these cases could present legislative findings as to the
nature of a unitary business. The willingness of the Court to restrain a broad assertion of
state taxing power under the Fourteenth Amendment does not necessarily mean that it
would restrain a similarly broad assertion of federal taxing power under the Fifth Amendment in the context of a treaty.
At two points in his article, Professor McDaniel seems to abandon the unitary business
principle. For example, he would include in the tax base of the payee any investment
income it received from a nonunitary NAFTA corporation if the payor deducted the payment (for example, interest, rents, royalties). McDaniel, note 1, at 720. If, however, the
unitary business requirement is constitutionally imposed, the income cannot be included in
the preapportionment tax base of the payee just because the payor deducted the payment.
Rather, for the income to be taxed by the payee, there must be a unitary business relationship between either the payor and the payee (which Professor McDaniel's example assumes is not part of the same unitary business as the payee) or between the income (or the
asset generating the income) and the unitary business of the payee. See Allied Signal, 504
U.S. at 771; Richard D. Pomp & Rebecca S. Rudnick, Federal Tax Concepts as a Guide for
State Apportionment of Dividends: Life After ASARCO, 18 Tax Notes 411, 419 (Nov. 8,
1982).
Similarly, Professor McDaniel states that "[a]ll types of passive investment income received from a non-NAF'A enterprise could be included in the apportionable income of
the NAFTA unitary enterprise." McDaniel, note 1, at 720. Again, the fact that the payor
is a non-NAFTA corporation does not override the unitary business requirement. (For
reasons having nothing to do with the unitary business requirement, Professor McDaniel
backs off from his statement that all types of passive investment income received from a
non-NAFTA enterprise could be included in the preapportionment tax base. Id. at 727
(qualifying this position with respect to dividends)).
In determining whether a state could tax a capital gain, the Court in, Allied Signal, 504
U.S. at 779-80, described the test as whether the "capital transaction serve[s] an operational rather than an investment function." This test presumably would be satisfied if the
income were effectively connected with the payee's unitary business, or Were considered to
be an integral part of the unitary business's everyday operations under the approach of
Corn Products, 350 U.S. 46 (1955). Compare Pomp & Rudnick, supra, at 418-19 with McDaniel, note 1, at [630].
38 See note 2. Some states distinguish between consolidated returns and combined reports. Although there is no uniformity of terminology among the stases, a consolidated
return generally includes only those related corporations that are directly taxable by the
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To illustrate the workings of a combined report, suppose a NAFTA
corporation owns a non-NAFTA subsidiary. Only the NAFTA parent
does business in the NAFTA region and only the parent has NAFTA
factors. In computing its preapportionment tax base under a combined report, the parent would consolidate its income with that of its
subsidiary and eliminate their intercorporate transactions. In addition, in applying the apportionment formula, the parent would consolidate the factors of the subsidiary with its own factors. Accordingly,
the preapportionment tax base and the apportionment percentage
(and thus the income assigned to the NAFTA countries) would remain unchanged if a corporation incorporated its branch and operated
it as a subsidiary or if a corporation liquidated its subsidiary and operated it as a branch.
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
state can impose a combined report on related corporations only if
they constitute a unitary business. 39 If, however, a unitary business
doctrine has no role to play in a NAFTA tax treaty, that requirement
can be dispensed with as a precondition to imposing a combined
report.
state, that is, those corporations that have nexus with the state. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws,
ch. 63, § 32B (West 1988). By contrast, a combined report determines the income of a
corporation subject to the taxing jurisdiction of the state by treating related corporations
that are part of the unitary business as if they were branches rather than separate entities.
It is irrelevant in computing the preapportionment income whether such related corporations are taxable by the state. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax Code § 25102 (West 1992). Some
states allow corporations that filed consolidated federal returns to file on a similar basis,
regardless of whether the corporations are part of a unitary business and regardless of
whether all the corporations have nexus with the state. See, e.g., Fla. Tax & Fin. Code

§ 220.131 (West 1989).
Professor McDaniel apparently would limit a combined report to only NAFTA corporations. He does not explicitly state this, but it is implicit in his self-imposed water's edge
constraint and in some of his other examples and discussion. Professor McDaniel is forced
to exclude non-NAFTA corporations from a combined report because if such corporations
were to be merged into the parent and operated as branches, he would exclude their nonNAFTA income from the preapportionment tax base. See McDaniel, note 1, at 727. To be
consistent, he must exclude the same income from the preapportionment tax base, whether
earned through a branch or through a subsidiary (or other related corporation). For situations where his discussion implicitly assumes that non-NAFTA corporations are excluded
from a combined report, see id. at 727, 738.
No need exists, however, to exclude a non-NAFTA corporation from a combined report.
Including non-NAFTA corporations in a combined report is not tantamount to taxing such
corporations-their inclusion is only to determine better the income of the NAFrA
corporation.
39 Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983). Consider, for
example, the parking lot/dry cleaning illustration above involving States A and B. Recall
that States A and B could not tax the income from the parking lot operation because it was
not part of the dry cleaning business. If the parking lot operations were incorporated, a
combined report could not be imposed on the parent and its subsidiary because they would
not be part of a unitary business.
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Even if a unitary business is not a precondition, one issue that needs
resolution is the threshold percentage of stock ownership that would
trigger the combined report. Some states use an 80% test,40 similar to
the federal rules on electing consolidated return treatment. 41 Others
use a "more than 50%" test. 42
An 80% test has little to commend itself, other than mirroring the
federal threshold for electing consolidated return treatment. A corporation wishing to avoid a combined report could avoid the 80% test
easily without sacrificing much of economic substance. The real policy
decision is the choice between a 50% test and a more than 50% test.
No state uses a 50% test. 43 But a more than 50% test has a major
disadvantage. As the federal experience with a more than 50% own40 Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-4-812(c)(2)(1994).
41 IRC § 1504.
42 Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 25105 (West 1992).
43
The [more than 50%] ownership requirement contemplates an element of controlling ownership over all parts of the business; the lack of controlling ownership standing alone requires separate treatment regardless of how closely the
business activities are otherwise integrated .... A mutual dependence and
contribution may exist between two enterprises, for example, where one enterprise supplies the raw materials for fabrication by a second enterprise. However, it would be improper to treat the two enterprises as unitary unless one
owns and controls the other. In the absence of such controlling ownership,
intercompany charges properly may be reflected by separate accounting. Generally speaking, controlling ownership can only be established by common
ownership, directly or indirectly, of more than 50 percent of a Corporation's
voting stock.
Appeal of Revere Copper & Brass, 1977 Cal. Tax LEXIS 38, at *10 (Cal. St. Bd. of Equal.
July 26, 1977).
In defending the more than 50% test, the court seems concerned with transfer pricing
issues. According to the court, without the element of control, intercompany charges properly will reflect the income of the separate entities. But the transfer pricing problem is only
one reason a combined report is preferable to separate accounting. As the Supreme Court
emphasized in Container Corp., a combined report captures the flow of values among units
of a corporate enterprise. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159,
178-79 (1983). Separate accounting is defective in measuring the contributions to Income
that result from functional integration, centralization of management and economies of
scale. Nothing stops a 50% shareholder from sharing in these contributions merely because it may not control the corporation. Realistically, of course, whether a 50% shareholder can exercise control is in part a function of how diffused the Ownership is in the
remaining shares of the corporation and the degree of cooperation among the other
shareholders.
In the context of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme
Court has stressed that before a unitary business can exist between the payors of dividends
and the payees in the same line of business, actual control must be exercised; the potential
to control is not sufficient. ASARCO, Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm'n,! 458 U.S. 307, 32223, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 961 (1982); F.W. Woolworth Co. v. New Mexico Tax'n & Rev.
Dep't, 458 U.S. 354,366-70, reh'g denied, 459 U.S. 961 (1981). A unitary business relationship between the payors and the payees is sufficient, but not necessary, for the dividends to
be taxed by the states having nexus with the payees. For the dividends to be taxed, the
shares that generate the dividends must serve an operational function in the hands of a
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ership requirement in Subpart F demonstrates, 44 taxpayers wishing to
avoid a combined report will be tempted to maintain de facto control
while reducing their stock ownership to 50% (or less). 45 The Subpart
F experience suggests the merits of a 50% test, which has the additional advantage of including legitimate joint ventures in a combined
report 46
The ability to form 50-50 joint ventures in tax haven countries also
argues forcefully for a 50% stock ownership test. Professor McDaniel
would deal with tax havens by denying deductions for amounts paid to
any corporation organized in a haven that was related to any corporation that was part of the unitary business.47 As he recognizes, this
payee rather than an investment function. See note 37. Consider, for example, excess
working capital that is invested by a corporation in shares of a mutual fund. Any dividends
distributed with respect to such shares could be taxed by states having nexus with the
corporation, notwithstanding that neither the mutual fund nor the corporations owned by
the fund stand in a unitary relationship with the payee. The ownership of the shares serves
an operational rather than an investment function. Id.
44 IRC § 957(a).
45 See Michael J. McIntyre, 2 The International Income Tax Rules of the United States
6-15 to 6-19 (1994).
46 A 50-50 joint venture could be viewed as a partnership. Each shareholder would
include in its preapportionment tax base 50% of the joint venture corporation's income
and 50% of its factors, provided there were no special allocations.
Professor McDaniel states, without any discussion, that "the unitary business should be
determined on an economic basis, not on a percentage of ownership basis (although high
percentage ownership would create a presumption of a unitary enterprise)." McDaniel,
note 1, at 712 n. 93. As the text suggests, I would not use a unitary concept unless required
by constitutional considerations. Moreover, an economic analysis of a unitary business
depends on the level of generality adopted. See notes 36, 37 and accompanying text. Because Professor McDaniel does not discuss the constitutional dimension of the problem,
presumably he has other reasons for requiring the existence of a unitary business. In any
event, I do not understand why any presumption of unitariness should be raised simply
because a parent owns a subsidiary. For example, a conglomerate easily might have a
holding company that owns 100% of its subsidiaries, each of which is in a different unitary
business from that conducted by the others. Unless Professor McDaniel is vlling to adopt
a very broad definition of a unitary business along the lines suggested in the text accompanying notes 36-37, an approach that essentially views all businesses a being in the unitary
business of maximizing their internal rate of return-a view that he would presumably
reject-the conglomerate example shows that stock ownership is not the key to determining a question of unitariness.
Professor McDaniel is on safer ground when he suggests:
a significant level of transactions between supposedly separate unitary businesses should be strong evidence (or create a presumption) that there is only a
single unitary business. The taxpayer would have a heavy burden of proof to
overcome this evidence (or presumption) and thus be able (or required) to use
arm's length reporting for interenterprise transactions.
Id. at 713-14. Through the use of these types of presumptions, Professor McDaniel hopes
to avoid the otherwise difficult problem of defining a unitary business and to avoid the
need of enforcing arm's length pricing among an enterprises different unitary businesses.
These are valid and significant objectives, which makes it puzzling why he rejects the easiest approach-a stock ownership test.
47 Id. at 733.
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would require the NAFTA countries to agree on a list of tax haven
countries, which may not be achievable. A combined report, however, automatically deals with tax haven corporations in a more complete manner. Intercorporate transactions among corporations
included in a combined report have no effect. Consequently, much of
the income shifting opportunities facilitated by the use of a tax haven
corporation would be undone. Moreover, to the extent that few activities of substance would take place in the haven country, the apportionment formula also would be unaffected.48 Because neither the
preapportionment tax base nor the apportionment formula would be
affected, a combined report would undercut the goals of using a tax
49
haven.
Notwithstanding all of its virtues, a combined report does not necessarily eliminate the need to police transfer prices. Consider, for example, a Canadian parent, its Japanese subsidiary and a U.S. subsidiary
of the Japanese subsidiary all doing business in the NAFTA region.
The orthodox interpretation of the U.S.-Japanese tax treatyo is that it
requires an arm's length approach in determining the income of the
Japanese corporation.5 1 (Presumably, the Canadian-Japanese treaty52
would be interpreted similarly.) The Canadian parent would calculate
its preapportionment tax base using a combined report that would include both its Japanese subsidiary and its U.S. grandchild,5 3 and the
U.S. corporation would calculate its preapportionment tax base using
a combined report that included both its Japanese parent and its Canadian grandparent.54 The Japanese corporation would determine its
48 Michael J. McIntyre, Design of a National Formulary Apportionment Tax System,
84th Conf. on Tax'n, Nat'l Tax Ass'n 118, 121 (Frederick D. Stocker ed. 1992) [hereinafter
Design].
49 California's old WWCR system eliminated the tax advantages flowing from the use of
tax havens. Perhaps it is not a coincidence that the corporation challenging California's
use of WWCR was Barclays Bank, with offices in some of the best-known tax havens of the
world-Bahamas, Barbados, Bermuda, Cayman Islands, Channel Islands, Gibraltar, Hong
Kong, Isle of Man, Naura, Netherlands Antilles, New Hebrides, Singapore, lrks and Caicos and Virgin Islands. See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 114 S. Ct. 2268 (1994);
Barclays International, A World of Banking-List of Offices 4-5 (1917). Professor McDaniel recognizes that a combined report would virtually eliminate the problem of tax
havens but seems to rank it third on his list of possible solutions. McDaniel, note 1, at
[643].
50 Income Tax Convention, Mar. 8, 1971, U.S.-Jap., Tax Treaties (CCH) I 5,203.
51 See generally Louis M. Kauder, The Unspecific Federal Tax Policy of Arm's Length:
A Comment on the Continuing Vitality of Formulary Apportionment at the Federal Level,
60 Tax Notes 1147 (Aug. 23, 1993).
52 Income Tax Convention, Nov. 14, 1987, Can.-Jap., Can. Tax Rep. (CCH) 34,391.
53 The Canadian parent would have no trouble gaining access to information about the
income and factors of its Japanese subsidiary and its U.S. grandchild because of its control
over these entities. See note 54.
54 Unlike the situation involving the Canadian parent, see note 53 and accompanying
text, the U.S. corporation would not have access as a matter of right to the income and
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income based on the transfer prices of transactions with the Canadian
and U.S. corporations. This example illustrates one of the interfacing
problems that are inherent in simultaneously administering a formulary apportionment/combined reporting system for some taxpayers
and an arm's length/source rule system for others.
B.

Designing the Apportionment Formula

Serious thought must be given to designing the formula (or formulas) for apportioning the tax base. The traditional three factor
formula (sales, property and payroll) evolved in the context of manufacturing and mercantile activities and has worked satisfactorily when
limited to that sector of the economy. The state experience suggests,
however, that the traditional formula does not work well for other
types of activities. The states have developed specialized formulas for
banking, publishing, mutual funds, communications, pipelines, transportation, natural resources and so forth.55 Some of these formulas
are intended to deal with industry-specific features, but others reflect
"beggar thy neighbor" policies intended to favor particular activities,
industries or taxpayers.
Specialized formulas, no matter how meritorious, come with a price:
A corporation's activities need to be characterized to determine the
factors of its Japanese parent or its Canadian grandparent. Exactly such a problem existed
under California's old WWCR system and was one of the grounds asserted by Barclays in
its unsuccessful challenge. Barclays, 114 S. Ct. 2268. The information access problem
might be easier at the federal level, however, than at the state level. The exchange of
information article in most tax treaties might provide access by the governments to the
needed data. See, e.g., OECD Treaty, note 20, Tax Treaties (CCH) 1 191.
In many situations, the combined report filed by the Canadian corporation would be
identical to the combined report filed by U.S. corporation. Therefore, the return filed by
the parent would provide all the needed information. As an illustration of where the combined reports would not be identical, assume that the Canadian corporation acquired the
Japanese subsidiary on July 1 and that the Japanese subsidiary acquired the U.S. subsidiary
on October 1. The activities reflected on the combined report filed by the Canadian corporation would reflect the activities of the Japanese corporation as of July 1 and the activities
of the U.S. corporation as of October 1. The combined report filed by the U.S. corporation
would reflect the activities of both the Canadian corporation and the Japanese corporation
as of October 1.
In the scenario in the text, Professor McDaniel apparently would not have the U.S. corporation file a combined report. McDaniel, note 1, at 738-39. Apparently, his self-imposed water's edge constraint requires that non-NAFrA corporations be excluded from a
combined report. See Section II.A. Accordingly, he would use arm's length principles to
determine the income of the U.S. corporation and then apply formulary apportionment to
assign a share of that income to the NAFTA countries. See notes 15, 16 and 57.
55 New York Tax Law § 210(3)(a)(2)(B) (newspaper receipts); § 210(3)(a)(2)(C) (closed
circuit and cable television transmissions) (McKinney 1986).
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formula. 56

applicable
In addition, the more categories, the greater the
likelihood that arm's length prices will need to be administered for
transactions among those parts of an enterprise subject to different
formulas. 57 As usual in taxation, this issue presents the common con58
ffict between precision and administrability.
Economic theory is unhelpful in designing apportionment formulas.
None of the existing formulas that the states use is grounded on economic principles or on economic models, nor were they intended to
be. Rather, the formulas are a political compromise that assign income in a manner acceptable to both the states of production and the
market states and also acceptable to the taxpayers involved.
The lack of economic theory does not mean that no principles are
available to inform the development of formulas. The principles that I
would endorse are the principles that Professor McIntyre has developed for designing source rules in the federal system: administrative
simplicity, neutrality, economic nexus, inclination to tax and sovereign
control of tax. 59 While all of these principles bear On designing a
formula, the inclination-to-tax principle has special significance in the
context of jurisdictional threshold rules.

56 These characterization problems raise issues similar to those raised by the definition
of a unitary business. Abandonment of the unitary business requirement, see Section II.B.,
should be accompanied by a decision to have as few formulas as possible.
57 McDaniel, note 1, at 711; see McIntyre, Design, note 48, at 120-21. For example,
suppose that financial activities were subject to a formula different from that used for manufacturing. Assume a corporation has both manufacturing and financing divisions. Presumably, arm's length type principles would be used to determine the preapportionment
income of the two divisions.
58 If all NAFTA countries had fairly similar tax rules and rates, (Professor McDaniel
assumes that rates would fall within a narrow range, McDaniel, note 1, at 708, with low
jurisdictional thresholds, see Section III.C. and accompanying text, and if most corporations doing business in the region had large NAFTA factors, the design problems would be
minimized. Under these conditions, a corporation would not have a serious financial stake
in the formula. All of its income would likely be apportioned and taxed by one of the
three NAFTA countries at a similar rate. Of course, the three NAFrA countries would
care greatly about the formula's revenue effects, but at least taxpayers would not lobby
over the details of the formula because they would pay the same amount in any event.
Professor McDaniel suggests that the starting point in designing a formula is one "that in
some broad sense, replicates the revenues derived by each country from its existing corporate tax." McDaniel, note 1, at 709. Even assuming that a formula could achieve this goal,
some corporations would pay more and others would pay less than they do currently.
Some transitional measures might be in order that would impose a special tax on the "winners" under formulary apportionment, the revenues of which might be used to subsidize
the "losers." Otherwise, losers, who nearly always seem to be more politically active than
winners, might threaten the viability of his proposal.
59 McIntyre, Design, note 48, at 3-65 to 3-70.
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C. JurisdictionalThreshold Rules
A relationship, not always fully appreciated, exists between the development of an apportionment formula and the jurisdictional threshold rules. The relationship is captured by what Professor McIntyre
refers to as the "inclination to tax": the formula should apportion income to countries that are inclined to tax it.60
Despite the radicalness of Professor McDaniel's general thesis of
using formulary apportionment within the NAFTA region, he is less
bold when discussing jurisdictional threshold issues and endorses the
conventional permanent establishment approach.6 ' If receipts are one
of the factors in an apportionment formula, the consequence of a permanent establishment threshold rule is that income may be assigned
to countries unable to tax it.62
As an alternative, Professor McDaniel might consider a threshold
standard based on market penetration, as evidenced by gross receipts
above a predetermined amount. In other words, a NAFTA corporation would be taxable in a NAFTA country if its gross receipts there63
exceeded a certain threshold amount. For example, why should a corporation that constructs a turnkey plant in five months for $10 million
60

To the extent feasible, income with an economic nexus in more than one
country should be sourced in a country that is inclined to subject the income to
taxation. By designing source rules to conform to the inclination-to-tax guideline, policy makers would reduce the risk of undertaxation, thereby promoting
fairness and economic efficiency. They would also make possible a generally
lower rate of tax on other sources of income.
[..
The assignment of source to the country of import is incompatible with
the permanent establishment requirement of tax treaties because importers
routinely avoid having a permanent establishment ....
Id. at 3-68 to 3-69.
61 Professor McDaniel favors a permanent establishment standard for the pragmatic
reason that a relatively uniform definition of permanent establishment already exists. McDaniel, note 1, at 707-08.
Professor McDaniel states that the "creation of a subsidiary in one country that is a part
of the unitary business of its parent corporation located in one of the other countries would
give rise to the right of the subsidiary's country to share in the tax base of the enterprise."
McDaniel, note 1, at 707. But it is difficult to see how that country would obtain any
jurisdiction to tax because a subsidiary does not automatically constitute a permanent
establishment.
62 This same defect greatly undermines Professor Avi-Yonah's proposal for a one factor
apportionment formula based on sales. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Slicing the Shadovr. A
Proposal for Updating U.S. International Taxation, 58 Tax Notes 1511 (Mar. 15, 1993). I
am grateful to Professor McIntyre for this particular insight.
63 Obviously, rules would be needed to define what is meant by a sale within a NAFTA
country. The common state apportionment formulas contain a sales factor and typically
define a sale as occurring within a state if the goods are shipped to points in that state.
New York Tax Law § 210(3)(a)(2)(A) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
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not be taxable merely because it did not have a permanent establishment under existing treaty definitions? 64
The state experience underscores the importance of the above comments. State income tax jurisdiction has been constrained by a federal
statute.65 In general, that statute prevents a state from levying an income tax on a foreign corporation 66 whose only activity in the state is
the solicitation of orders for tangible personal property that will be
approved outside the state and filled from outside the state. 67 The
federal statute increases the likelihood that a corporation may apportion income to a state that does not have the power to tax. To deal
with this situation, the Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes
Act (UDITPA)6 and the Multistate Tax Compact 69 incorporate a socalled throwback rule: "sales of tangible personal property are in this
state [and thus included in the numerator of the receipts factor] if:...
the property is shipped from an office, store, warehouse, factory, or

64 The possibility that a corporation might have a receipts factor in a country in which it
does not have a permanent establishment can be minimized through the use of throwout or
throwback rules, but the problem should be addressed frontally through an economically
meaningful jurisdictional standard such as market penetration. For a discussion of
throwout and throwback rules, see Richard D. Pomp, Reforming a State Income Tax,51
Alb. L. Rev. 375, 704-07 (1987); see also note 70.
65 15 U.S.C. § 381 (1994) (setting minimum standards for imposition of state net income

tax).
66 In this context, a foreign corporation is one incorporated outside the taxing state.
67

No State, or political subdivision thereof, shall have power to impose... a net
income tax on the income derived within such State by any person from interstate commerce if the only business activities within such State by or on behalf
of such person during such taxable year are either, or both, of the following:
(1) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, n such State
for sales of tangible personal property, which orders are sent outs de the State
for approval or rejection, and, if approved, are filled by shipment or delivery
from a point outside the State; and (2) the solicitation of orders by such person, or his representative, in such State in the name of or for the benefit of a
prospective customer of such person, if orders by such customer to such person
to enable such customer to fill orders resulting from such solicittion are orders described in paragraph (1).
15 U.S.C. § 381(a) (1994).
68 UDITPA was formulated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1957. UDITPA, 7A U.L.A. 336 (1985). A majority of the states that levy a
tax on or measured by income have adopted UDITPA in whole or in part. UDITPA specifies an equally weighted, three factor formula, UDITPA, § 9.4; today, it is common for
states to double weight the sales factor. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax Code Ann. § 25128
(West Supp. 1994); 1993 Cal. Stats., ch. 946, § 1; New York Tax Law §,210(3)(a)(4) (McKinney 1986 & Supp. 1995).
69 Multistate Tax Compact, reprinted in 2 Multistate Corporate Income Tax Guide
(CCH) 8450 (1985).
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other place of storage in this State and ...the taxpayer is not taxable
'70
in the State of the purchaser.
The state experience also points out a fundamental difference between formulary apportionment and the residence-based federal system. In the federal system, income often escapes source taxation
because a corporation does not have a permanent establishment.
Sometimes this result will simply mean that the country of residence
will increase its share of the tax base because there vill be no source
tax that will be creditable against the residence country tax. In a formulary system, by contrast, the stakes can be much higher. If income
is apportioned to a jurisdiction that lacks the power to tax, it escapes
taxation by all jurisdictions. Accordingly, the higher the threshold
rules, the greater the need for anti-avoidance techniques. The state
experience suggests the merit in having low threshold rules, such as
the gross receipts approach mentioned above.
I.

SPECIAL PROBLimS ARISING FROBI SWITCBING TO FoR

APPORTONmENT IN THE CoNTEXT

nmiu
ARY

OF NALFTA

A. Rule Shopping and Tax Administration Shopping
Professor McDaniel is correct that his proposal would eliminate
treaty shopping among the NAFTA countries. 7 ' My fear, however, is
that, unless the three countries adopted identical tax systems, rule
shopping would replace treaty shopping. Consider, for example, that
currently Mexico does not have the equivalent of § 367. Suppose a
U.S. corporation wanted to avoid the impact of § 367. Presumably, it
could make a tax-free transfer of the target assets to a Mexican corporation,72 which could then transfer the assets tax-free offshore. One
way to stop this type of tax avoidance would be to require Mexico, as
part of any NAFTA tax treaty, to adopt provisions equivalent to
§ 367. More generally, all three countries would have to adopt essen70 UDITPA, § 16; Multistate Tax Compact, note 69, art. IV, § 16, at 1 8,470. An alternative approach is a so-called "throwout" rule. Under a throwout rule, if a corporation is not
subject to income tax in the destination state, the receipts from such sales are excluded
from both the numerator and the denominator of the receipts factor.
State apportionment formulas typically use receipts, property and payroll. When income
is apportioned to a state that lacks the power to tax, normally, it is because of the receipts
factor, but similar types of problems can arise in the case of the property and payroll factors. See Pomp, note 64, at 705-06; cf. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 78
(1993), where the court adopted a throwout rule for property in interpreting § 1.8633(b)(2) (Ex. 2(iv)) of the Regulations.
71 McDaniel, note 1, at 713.

72 See id.
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tially identical tax laws; otherwise, problems similar to the above
would surface in other contexts. 73
Although identical rules would preclude rule shopping, a corporation might also shop for the least vigorous tax enforcement. If, for
example, Mexico were viewed as having the least competent tax administration, a transaction could be structured so that it would be reported on a return filed only in Mexico. 74 To be sure, the
disallowance of tax-free transfers among NAFTA corporations would
mitigate this type of problem but that approach would be inconsistent
with viewing the three countries as part of one integrated economic
union. The ultimate solution is equally competent tax administrations, which underscores the significance of a trilateral NAFTA tax
agency, staffed with personnel from all three countries. 75
Another illustration of the necessity of uniform rules and uniform
tax administration involves the U.S. treatment of a controlled foreign
corporation (CFC). Suppose a U.S. parent has a Mexican CFC, which
has a non-NAFTA CFC. Under subpart F, the U.S. parent might be
76
taxed on the income of the Mexican CFC or the non-NAFTA CFC.
But suppose the parent were merged tax-free into its Mexican subsidiary, resulting in a Mexican corporation with a non-NAFTA CFC. Because Mexico does not have CFC rules comparable to the U.S. rules,
this scenario would allow the U.S. parent to achieve a tax savings because the preapportionment tax base would now exclude the income
77
of the CFC.

73 Professor McIntyre's example of how the adoption of a Canadian GST sent shoppers
scurrying to malls on the U.S. side of the border is another reminder of the need to harmo-

nize tax systems in a free trade area. McIntyre, Commentary, note 8, at 783-84. From the
perspective of a Canadian shopper, the United States looked like a tax haven (no federal
sales tax and relatively low state sales taxes). With low transaction costs (that is, a short
ride to the border), the Canadian consumer, like other forms of movable capital, sought
out the higher return available from the United States.
74 One way to achieve this result is to have the transaction executed by a corporation
having factors only in Mexico.
75 See McDaniel, note 1, at 725.
76 See IRC § 951(a).
77 The problem in the text would be solved if the Mexican corporation were to file a
combined report with its non-NAFTA subsidiary. Professor McDaniel's water's edge constraint, however, would prevent the inclusion of a non-NAFrA corporation in the combined report.

Problems similar to those referred to in the text can arise in the state context. For example, states such as Delaware that have favorable rules on the taxation of intangible income,
Del. Code Ann. tit. 30, § 1902(b)(8) (1984 & Supp. 1994), are the domestic counterpart of

foreign tax havens and are often used in tax avoidance situations. See, e.g., Geoffrey, Inc.
v. South Carolina Tax Comm'n, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
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B.

The Treatment of Dividends

One of the stickier design issues involves the treatment of dividends. There are a number of issues involving dividends, some
presenting fewer problems than others.
The easiest case involves dividends paid by a corporation that was
included in a combined report with the payee. The dividend should
be excluded from the payee's preapportionment tax base. Consistent
with the theory of a combined report, there should be no tax consequences triggered by the movement of earnings among corporations
78
included in the combined report.
Another possibility is that the dividend is paid to a NAFTA corporation by another NAFTA corporation that is not part of the combined report. 79 Professor McDaniel would exempt the dividend
because the profits out of which the dividend is paid already have
been included in the NAFTA tax base of the payor.80 Consequently,
he would treat this situation the same as if the dividend were paid by a
corporation that was included in the payee's combined report.81
Why these two situations should be treated the same is unclear. In
the first situation, where both the payor and payee are NAFTA corporations, the combined report would have the effect of treating all
members of the unitary business as if they were branches or divisions
of the same taxpayer. In that situation, a dividend from a subsidiary
included in the payee's combined report is viewed properly as the
shifting of money within the same enterprise. The dividend would
have no taxable consequence for the same reason that a shifting of
funds from one division of a corporation to another generally has no
tax effect. In the second situation, however, the payor and the payee
do not file a combined report and are not viewed properly as part of
the same enterprise. If the dividend is to be exempt, it must be for
reasons that Professor McDaniel does not articulate.
Consider, for example, a Mexican subsidiary of a U.S. corporation.
Assume that the parent and its subsidiary do not conduct a unitary
business under Professor McDaniel's approach so that no combined
report would be filed. To take a slightly unrealistic but informative
example, suppose the Mexican subsidiary apportioned 1% of its income to Mexico under the applicable apportionment formula, and
78

For a fuller explanation, see note 2.

79 The payor might not be part of the combined report because it is not part of the

unitary business conducted by the payee (if such a requirement were a prerequisite to the
filing of a combined report, see Section ILB.), or the payor might not have the minimum
ownership interest in the payee required to file a combined report. See note 43 and accompanying text.
EDMcDaniel, note 1, at 720.
81 Id. at 706, 712, 720 and 727.
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none to the United States. Assume the Mexican subsidiary paid a
$100 dividend to its U.S. parent, which apportioned all of its income to
the United States because, under the applicable formula, it had only
U.S. factors. Why should the apportionment of 1% of the subsidiary's
income to Mexico exempt the dividend from being apportioned 100%
to the United States?
I could understand a rule that exempted that part of the dividend
that was assumed to be paid out of profits already taxed by the United
States. 82 I also could understand a rule that exempted that part of the
dividend that was assumed to be paid out of profits already taxed
by Mexico, although the U.S. foreign tax credit already addresses the
double taxation issue. But I do not see the logic in a 100%
exemption.83
In any event, assuming, as Professor McDaniel does, that the dividend would be fully exempt, transitional rules and tracing rules would
be needed. Continuing the preceding examlle, assume the Mexican
subsidiary has profits that accrued prior to the start of the new
NAFTA formulary regime. Should these profits be exempt because
they already would have been taxed by a NAFTA country? If not, a
tracing rule would be needed to decide the order in which profits from
the pre- and postformulary regimes are considered to be paid as dividends. Tracing rules also would be needed because not all dividends
paid after the start of the new rules necessarily would be paid out of
profits taxed by one of the NAFTA countries.84
82 For example, assume, contrary to the example in the text, that the Mexican payor had
apportioned some of its income to the United States because it had U.S. factors and satisfied the U.S. jurisdictional threshold. Under this assumption, the United States already
has taxed the Mexican corporation on part of the profits that are now distributed to the
U.S. parent and it could logically choose to exempt such part.
83 If a unitary business principle is a precondition to taxability, then the dividends might
be exempt because either the income itself or the business of the payor did not stand in a
unitary business relationship with the payee. If no such principle is required, the dividends
automatically would enter into the preapportionment tax base of the payee. One example
in which dividends might constitute the unitary business income of the payee regardless of
the activities of the payor, involves working capital. Suppose a corporation parks its working capital in an equity mutual fund. The dividends paid by the mutual fund would be
viewed as part of the working capital of the corporation and would be included in the
preapportionment tax base along with the corporation's other unitary business income.
See note 43.
84 For example, assume that the Mexican subsidiary referred to in the text apportioned
one-half of its income to NAFTA countries. Any dividend paid by the Mexican subsidiary
to its U.S. parent would not be paid entirely out of profits that would have been taxed by
the NAFrA countries. Tracing rules would need to be developed to specify what part of
the dividend should be exempt because it was viewed as being paid frqm NAFTA-taxed
income and what part should enter into the preapportionment tax base of the payee because the profits out of which the dividend was paid were viewed as never having borne
any NAFTA tax.
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Professor McDaniel is able to ignore these situations because he
would exclude dividends paid by non-NAFTA subsidiaries from the
preapportionment tax base.85 He does so, inter alia, because their inclusion would violate his notion of a water's edge system.86 His prior
defense of a water's edge approach s7 is less applicable here. I do not
understand how the exclusion of the dividend is required by existing
tax treaties because currently foreign source dividends are already
taxable. In addition, unlike the foreign response to California's
worldwide combined reporting, the taxation of foreign source dividends by the United States has not aroused any opposition and is accepted international practice. More fundamentally, federal concepts
of source have no role to play in a formulary apportionment regime.8s
V.

CONCLUSION

Professor McDaniel's article is an intellectual tour de force. He and
I agree on the major contours of the move toward a system of formulary apportionment/combined reporting in the NAFTA region. True,
we might quibble over some details. My own preference, for example,
would be to abandon the water's edge and unitary business constraints
that Professor McDaniel embraces. Moreover, I would adopt generous combined reporting rules. In addition, I would minimi e the
number of apportionment formulas and incorporate low level jurisdictional rules.
The difference in our views may reflect the weight that I place on
the experience of the states and the implications of that experience for
NAFTA. I have drawn on the learning of the states regarding the
more fundamental and structural issues inherent in formulary appor85 McDaniel, note 1, at 727. This exclusion is apparently a gloss on his general assertion
that "all types of passive investment income received from a non-NAFTA enterprise could
be included in the apportionable income of the NAFTA unitary enterprise." Id. at 720.
86 Id. Professor McDaniel also notes that including the dividends in the preapportionment tax base of a NAFTA-based parent would create locational distortions and distortions in repatriation decisions because non-NAFTA corporations would not include such
dividends in their tax base. McDaniel, note 1, at 727. The more general point-and probably more significant point-is that a formulary apportionment regime for NAFTA corporations that would coexist with a separate accounting/source rule regime for all other
corporations would have the potential to induce locational distortions. Intuitively, I do not
have a feel for the magnitude or severity of this more general problem. Presumably, deciding to proceed with formulary apportionment is tantamount to deciding that locational
risks are outweighed by other advantages. Of course, one could proceed with formulary
apportionment but decide that the treatment of dividends causes a special set of risks.
Professor McDaniel, however, has not made that argument. Moreover, the foreign tax
credit, which still would be available even under formulary apportionment, see McDaniel,
note 1, at 713, 720, would mitigate the problem.
87 See notes 13-23 and accompanying text.
88 See Section ].A.
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tionment. The insights garnered from over 50 years of state experimentation cannot be easily dismissed. In a sense, the states provide us
with a window into the future. To' paraphrase the philosopher
Santayana, those who do not know the mistakes of the states are condemned to repeat them.8 9 Rarely when federal tax legislation is
proposed is there any relevant experience from comparable jurisdictions to study. That fortunately is not the case with formulary
apportionment.

89 "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." George
Santayana, 1 The Life of Reason 284 (2d ed. 1922). Professor McDaniel relies less on the
state experience than I do because "[m]any of [their] problems can be resolved or avoided
in a system developed by national government agreement." McDaniel, note 1, at 705. If
he means that a trilateral tax treaty can impose a solution on problems the states live with,
I would agree. But certainly the state experience identifies the problems requiring a solution. Indeed, a comparison of the apportionment formulas used by most states to deal with
manufacturing activities, see, e.g., New York Tax Law § 210(3)(a)(2) (McKinney 1986 &
Supp. 1995); 72 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 7401(2)(a)(1)(A) (1994), with their federal counterpart in
§ 1.863-3T(b)(2) of the Regulations illustrates well the level of sophistication that the
states have achieved. For example, the issues first addressed in Phillips Petroleum v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 78 (1993), discussed in note 70, have long been resolved by most states.
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